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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\

ARCHIE LEININGER,
)
Plaintiff-Appellant_,
vs.
I

No.
STEARNS- ROGER MANUF AC- \
TURING COMPANY, a corpora- . 10193
tion, XYZ COMPANY, a corporation, X, Y and Z, a co-partnership,
DOES I through V,
Defendants-Respo11,dents. 1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
plaintiff in an explosion in the course of his employment
brought against defendant Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company who contracted for and constructed
a uranium ore processing plant at Mexican Hat, Utah,
for Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation, the plaintiff's
employer.
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· DISPOSITION IN LOWER C·OURT
'

'

'

...,

-

1

•

•

I

Foll,?~ing

the pretrial hearing, Third District
Judge A. H. Ellett~ granted a motion. for sullllnary
judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
and entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment dismissing
the action and Jor jt;~dgment _ordering the case be remande.d for trial.
': .
i

.·

i STATEMENT OF'FACTS

The defendant, Stearns-Roger Manufacturing
Company, a corporation, will be referred to in this
brief as "Stearns." The Texas-Zinc Mi11erals Corporation, the plaintiff's :employer, will be referred to as
"T-Z."
On April 18, 1956, T-Z contracted for the construction. by Stearns of a uranium ore processing plant
near Mexican· H.at,. Utah. (Plf. Ex. I) The seven
million dollar mill was completed by Stearns in N ovember,'I957, and turned over to
·T-Z for operation~
.

..

.

Stearns was experienced in · erecting, designing
and constructing such plants, having been engaged in
the design, engineering, fabrication and construction of
power, petroleum, mining, sugar, chemical and aerospace industries throughout the states of Texas, Colo-

4
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rado and Utah, and held itself out as industrial construction and design experts since I855. (Plf. Ex. I,
R. II3, I64)
Stearns undertook this construction, not only as
contractor, but as the designer, engineer and industrial
architect. (Plf. Ex. I, 2, 3, 4)
Prior to constructing the T -Z mill, Stearns provided engineering services and procurement of equipment and inspection of construction for Rare Metals
Corporation of America, Tuba City, Arizona, uranium
mill, and also had provided engineering services, procurement of equipment, necessary construction and
other services for the l{ermac Nuclear Fuels Corporation uranium mill at Grants, New Mexico. (R. 164,
Ans. to Plf. Interrog. No. 35)
Stearns conceded it had long association with Duriron Corporation going back to February I, I925, when
it was distributor for Duriron Company equipment in
the Denver area. (R. 165) Stearns also provided engineering services, procurement of equipment and necessary construction for the installation of equipment with
buildings for the Petrotomics Company, Shirley Basin,
Wyoming. (R. 74) Stearns' association with uranium
construction started for Rare Metals Corporation in
1955, Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation in 1956, Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corporation in 1957, and Petrotomics Company in 1961. (R. 74)
On October 10, 1956, Stearns purchased for instal-

5
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lation at T-Z, in accordance with contract specifications,
two Durco type B-124, corrosion resisting fans. (Plf.
Ex. 5, R. 71) These fans were delivered December 5,
1956; and other than routine inspection and mechanical
checking after installation to determine proper rotation
of the fan and mechanical sufficiency, Stearns concedes
that it did not perform any other tests on said fans.
(R. 72) These fans were installed at T-Z chemical
laboratory assay plant (Plf. Ex .. 2, 3, 4) and had been
warranted by the manufacturer, the Duriron Company,
Inc., .Dayton, Ohio~ as corrosion .resisting fans. (Plf.
Ex .. 6):
· "The Durco B-Series fans are completely new
and improved exhausters for ,corrosive fumes and
gases. ;A :p.ew design utilizing the unexcelled corrosion resistence of a Duriron casing coupled
with a Durament 20 multi-blade rotary of the
foreward curve design, makes the Durco Fans
completely corrosion resistent. All parts in contact with the corrosive fumes are of solid corro, sion resistent alloys - no surface coating, paint
or lining: to. deteriorate and fail. Durco Exhaust
fans are used in hospitals, schools, laboratories
and industrial application; wherever corrosive
. fumes are· a problem." On· August 8, 1960, a. work order was issued by
Mr. R. L. Maurice, chief chep1ist f~r T-Z, to dis~antle
the west fume fan suction- blower at the chemistry
laboratory. The west fan was dis-assembled, repaired
and set back in place by plaintiff without incident. (R.
88) A second work order was issued to complete maintenance on the east fan on August 16, 1960. This work
6
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was not commenced until early in September, 1960.
While plaintiff was removing the sealing compound
from the dismantled east fan on September 12, 1960,
the fan exploded, seriously and permanently injuring
plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered multiple wounds to his face,
both eyes, left hand, arm, left leg and body. The
wounds represented the points of entry of hundreds
of metal fragments ranging from tiny dust-like particles to larger fragments measuring up to three ems.
The metal fragments produced loss of vision, visual
efficiency, impairment of muscles and nerves resulting
in great pain and serious permanent injuries. (R. 3)
Plaintiffi's injuries necessitated hospital, doctor
and medical expenditures in the amount of $4,042.54 to
date. (Plf. Ex. 14)
The cause of this explo$ion phenomena by uncontroverted evidence was the fan manufacturer used an
organic cement which contained a litharge and glycerin
sealing compound which sealed the rear face plate housing the blower shaft on all Durco type B-124 fans.
The fan was designed to exhaust corrosive laboratory
fumes and gases out of the assay ovens, up through
the fume hood into the atmosphere. The explosion
resulted from the formation of explosive compounds
formed from reactions between perchloric acid fumes
•
and this litharge glycerin organic sealing compound on
the rear plate housing of the fan. (R. 77-82, 84, 96,
97, Plf. Ex. 7-12)
The scientific data concedes that perchloric acid

7
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is well known to. be an inherently dangerous explosive.
If con~ensates of .perchloric acid are allowed to gather
in the crevices between th~ assembled parts of a fan
or o:p..any part of a fan, such. condensates may explode,
spontaneously, by friction. or, in the presence of moder~te heat, or if the fan is subject to any impact or
prooing for the, purpose of inspection, maintenance or
di~a~sembling. While the metals in these fans are nonexplosive, alone? or in the combination with each other,
perchloric .residue is explosive.. (Plf. Ex. II) _The fan
w4ich exploded during course of maintenance by plaintiff had accumulated perchloric acid condensates and
was inherently a dangerous time bomb.
R~view

of the scientipc literature pertaining to the
use of perchloric acid demonstrates that perchloric acid
is explosive at all times, but becomes particularly perilous when used in conjunction with· some organic compounds. Despite the· fact that litharge and glycerin
harden to a cement like compo~nd' upon setting, one
theory is that· there· is some free· glycerin or glycerides
present which, ,upon impregnation of the cement by
perchloric acid condensates, ·results in a compound
which can be ·exploded· upon impact, impression of
slowly generated heat or other facts.' (Plf. Ex. I2; See
Affidavit of Wayne 0. Ursenbach, Plf.'s 'expert,
R. I69-I71, summarizing the characteristics of perchloric acid and the expert testimony that: ''the design,
construction and components of the chemical laboratory
at T-Z containing an exhaust blower fan with organic
sealing tnaterials does not meet industry standards and

8
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safe practice standards and was inherently dangerous
and that knowledge of said danger would or should
have been known to any qualified contractor engaged
in design and construction of such chemical laboratories, fume hoods and exhaust systems.")
Nowhere in the defendant's case were these scientific
opinions and facts disputed at all, nor were there any
contradictory affidavits filed in the action.
These scientific findings are set forth in witnesses'
depositions (see depositions of Maurice, Bush,
Williams and George), namely, that fumes from perchloric acid condenses on and are absorbed by the
organic material on the fans thus creating a bomb which
could be exploded either spontaneously or under normal maintenance. (R. 165)
Prior to the explosion which injured plaintiff, on
June 29, 1959, a Mr. Warren E. Bush incurred flash
burns to both eyes when an explosion blew some of the
identical sealing grout from around the rear cover plate
of an exhaust fan located at the Lucius Pitkin, Inc.
Chemical Laboratory, at the Atomic Energy Commission Mill, Grand Junction, Colorado. This explosion
occurred when Mr. Bush prodded the seal with a screwdriver. (Plf. Ex. 7)
Defendant Stearns admitted in answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 15 (R. 72) that it had knowledge of the Lucius Pitkin explosion, that it also had
knowledge of a similar explosion of a fan at the 'l.\1ba
9
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City mill which happened prior to August 10, 1960,
and that it also had· information regarding a similar
explosion on February 27, 1962, in which a workman
was killed at the Sesquehanna Western Uranium mill
near Riverton, Wyolll:ing. There were, therefore, two
prior and similar explosions of these fans during normal niaintena~: One, in June, 1959, and the other
prior to August, 1960, all prior to the explosion which
injured plaintiff on· September 12, 1960.
To plaintiff's request for· admission of facts (R.
100, 101), defendant Stearns· admits ·the Duriron exhaust fan which it installed at Rare Metals Corporation
Tuba City plant during 1956, which exploded prior to
August, 1960,- contained the same organic mixture
(the grouting cement ··which sealed the rear face plate
to the blower housing on the fan installed at TexasZinc) and was co~posed of litharge and glycerin, an
organic material. (R. 112) Defendant Stearns also
concedes that. the fan which exploded at Lucius Pitkin
in June, 1959, contained the same cement mixture.
(R. 112) Defendant Stearfl:s alleged it became aware
of these.; facts on,ly afte! the commencement of plaintiff's action, and it had no knowledge of any explosions
prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. (R. 112)
•

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published
a report dated September 15, 1959, entitled Issue No.
101 (Plf. Ex. 7) which ,fully described the explosion
experienc~d by Mr. B.ush on June 29, 1959. (R. 105)
All fans manufactured by Duriron Company after

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

November 11, 1959, were furnished with a grouting
cement composed of a silica flour and sauereisen binder,
a non-organic compound, instead of the litharge and
glycerin material. (R. 74, Def. Ans. No. 36 to Plf.
Interrog.) Defendant Stearns admits it made no
changes in the fans installed at Texas-Zinc at any time
prior to or after the explosion which injured plaintiff
on September 12, 1960. (R. 74}
Defendant Stearns admits that it gave only ordinary start up instructions with information as to lubrication and similar items to T-Z after it installed the fan.
(R. 73, Ans. 22 to Plf. Interrog.) Nor were detailed
manuals of operation and maintenance furnished to
T-Z. (R. 73, Ans. 24 to Plf. Interrog.)
Defendant Stearns gave plaintiff's employer no
warning whatsoever of the inherently dangerous hazard
in this case.
The use of perchloric acid in connection with assaying and analyzing uranium ores is a standard procedure
throughout the uranium industry. (Depo. of Warren
Bush, p. 6, line 17; Depo. of D'Arcy George, AEC
Scientist, p. 48, line 141, p. 49, line 142, p. 50, line 145;
Depo. of Robert Lewis Maurice, Jr., Chief Chemist,
T -Z, pp. 38-40)
At the time T-Z accepted the laboratory from contractor Stearns, Chief Chemist Maurice did not kno'v
that the cem.ent grouting (packing) in these fans was
an organic compound, or that with the amount of perIl
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chloric acid used in the laboratory, there would be
a hazard or danger created. (Depo. of Robert Le,vis
Maurice, Jr., p. 38, lines 9-15)
Maurice testified, on deposition, that he instructed
Stearns to go to the Grand Junction lab and observe
the Duriron type of fan in use specifying these fans to
be installed at T-Z lab in Mexican Hat, Utah. (Maurice Depo., pp. 3, 4)
Maurice admitted he did not know what caused the
Leininger explosion but following the Leininger explosion, he ·called Lucius Pitkin lab· in Grand Junction
and learned of the litharge· glycerin problem. (Maurice
Depo., pp. 8, 9) Maurice had also heard about the Tuba
City, Arizona, incident, but did not know the cause of
the explosion. (Maurice Depo., p. 11)
At the time Maurice ordered the maintenance
work on the fan he did not know that the sealing cement
was composed of litharge glycerin and therefore constituted any hazard. (Maurice Depo., p. 37, lines 12-14)
Maurice testified on deposition that the work order
given to plaintiff included 'the language, "Be sure to
wash with water before removing. Watch out for acid.''
This, however, was a. warning .to watch for the acid
outside the blowers (Maurice Depo., p. 6, line 24), but
he was totally unaware of the composition of the cement
grouting or seal. (Maurice Depo., pp. 7, 8, p. 15, lines
10-29) It was not an explosion that Maurice had
warned against, it was simply a precaution to keep
workers from being burned with acid on the fans that

12
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he cautioned them, "to wash the fan down with water."
(Maurice Depo., p. 20, lines 1-5)
l\1aurice admitted that he ordered plaintiff to refill
the grouting cement with a product called phenaline,
but unfortunately that too was organic and dangerous,
and this was not found out until after the accident.
(Maurice Depo., p. 27, lines 26-30, p. 28, lines 1-12)
Plaintiff Leininger denied that Maurice had ever
explained to him the danger involved in doing this
work or the risk involved. On his deposition, Mr. Leininger testified that when he took the fans off their
mounting outside the chem lab, he had to use a cutting
torch because the bolts were stuck, and he could not use
a wrench on them. (Leininger Depo., p. 12, line 26)
He obtained permission to do this from his supervisor,
Mr. Tyler. (Leininger Depo., p. 13, lines 1, 2) Nor
was he warned about scraping or striking any part of
the fan where the packing was located (Leininger
Depo., p. 13, lines 15-18) The only precaution was to
wash the fan down on the outside with a caustic solution
furnished by Mr. Maurice. (Leininger Depo., p. 19,
lines 9-17) With an assistant, Mr. Wells, plaintiff
Leininger prepared to sandblast the fan preparatory
to painting. (Plf. Depo., p. 20, lines 14-24) The sandblasting was halted by supervisor Tyler but without
any reason. (Leininger Depo., p. 20, line 27)
The injuries received by plaintiff kept him away
from his employment from the date of the accident
until June 1, 1961. (Leininger Depo., p. 22)

13
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ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
POINT I. BY HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WORK AFTER COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE BY T-Z.
Even in jurisdictions which retain the rule of nonliability of contractors after work is completed and
accepted, there is a well recognized exception to this
antiquated doctrine, namely that the contractor is liable
when the product of his work is inherently or imminently dangerous. See Do~ v. Holly Manufacturing
Company_, (Cal. 19~8), 321 P.2d 736.
This Court long ago accepted this doctrine in Berg
v·. Otis Elevator Cornpany (1924), 64 Utah 518, 231
Pac. 832, and again in Sutton ·v. Otis Elevator Comp-any ( 1926), 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437, where the
Court said:
"In the light of the numerous authorities we
have examined upon this question, we feel justified in saying, once for all, that the cases arising
under the general rule are simply cases of ordinary negligence. The dang~r created by the ~or~
is not imminent. If there Is danger at all, It IS
usually remote and more or less improbable. It
may well be that in a case of that kind, when the

14
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contractee accepts the work, he thereafter assumes
responsibility for consequences resulting from its
use, and the independent contractor is exempt
fron1 liability, even for injury resulting from his
own negligence. Such would seem to be a wholesome rule in that class of cases. But let us suppose
that the 'vork which the independent contractor
undertakes to perform is of such a nature that,
unless it is done with reasonable care, a condition
will be created which is imminently dangerous to
the safety of others 'vho may use the instrumentality; suppose, further, that the contractor knows
of the danger created by him, or under the circumstances is presumed to know it, and the
danger is not known to the contractee and is so
hidden and concealed that he cannot discover it
upon reasonably careful inspection; suppose in
consequence of such negligence, an accident occurs and injury results - can it be consistently
contended that the contractor can escape liability
because the contractee, who was ignorant of the
danger and could not discover it upon reasonable
inspection, failed to do something which might
have prevented the injuries? Is not this a different situation altogether from that to 'vhich the
general rule applies? If so, then why contend for
immunity which is obtainable only under the
general rule?"
Restatement of 'Torts, Section 385, American Law
Institute, states the modern rule:
"One who on behalf of the possessor of land
erects a structure or creates any other condition
thereon is subject to liability to others within or
without the land for bodily harm caused to them
by the dangerous character of the structure or
condition after his work has been accepted by the
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poss~ss~r.

under the same rules *** determining
the hab1hty of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use
of others."
Comment b, Section 385, states:
"As the liability of a servant or an independent
contractor who erects a structure upon land or
otherwise changes its physical condition is determined by the same rules as those which determine
the liability of a manufacturer of chattel, it follows that such a servant or contractor who turns
over the land with knowledge that his work has
made it dangerous in a manner unlikely to be
discovered by the possessor is subject to liability
both to the possessor, and those who come upon
the land with the consent of the possessor or who
are likely to be in its vicinity."
In such cases the negligence of the contractee, if
any, in accepting the work and putting it to use does
not cancel the negligence of the contractor in creating
the dangerous condition for as the Restatement, Comment b, Section 385, continues:
"A servant or contractor who turns over the
land to his employer in a condition made dangerous by his failure to exercise reasonable care, is
liable for harm caused by it, after his employer
has accepted the work, not only to his employer
but to all persons whom he should expect to be
upon the land with the consent of his employer or
to be in its vicinity."
Here defendant Stearns' original negligence
ripened into injury after completion and acceptance
of the uranium mill. Plaintiff's theory of defendant's
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liability, both in negligence and in breach of warranty,
is this - the design and construction of this chemical
laboratory by Stearns was defective either by virtue
of the condition it was in when the work was completed,
or by virtue of its likelihood of becoming dangerous
through its normal and foreseeable use.
Installation of the Duriron fan, containing an
organic sealing compound, which in time by exhausting
perchloric acid fumes, created a bomb which Stearns
knew, should have known, or by reason of its special
skill and competence had reason to know, the likelihood
of the explosion hazard involved.
Plaintiff's case, based upon five separate causes
of action, sets forth not only design and construction
negligence but failure to test, and determine the concealed danger as well as failure to warn the plaintiff;
and three causes in breach of warranty, express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability and fitness
for purpose.
The case law in support of these doctrines is fully
annotated at 58 A.L.R.2d, p. 891 through 898.

In Hanna v. Fletcher (1956), 97 App. D.C. 310,
231 F.2d 469, 58 A.L.R. 2d 847, cert. deniedJ it was
held:
"A person injured by reason of the contractor's negligence may recover from the contractor even if the injury occurred after the product of his defective work was accepted by the
party who engaged him.''
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The quote relied on the landmark decision, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Compa·ny~ Ill N.E. 1050. See
Dean Prosser, "The Law of Torts," 2d Ed. Sec. 85,
p. 519, holding:
"Independent building and construction
contractors should be held to a general standard
of reas.onable care for the protection of third
parties who may be foreseeably in danger by the
contractor's negligence even after acceptance of
the work.''
This doctrine has been accepted in Foley v. PittsburghDes Moines Co. (1949), 68 A.2d 517, in which the
manufacturer of a large tank was held liable for its
negligence in failing to use reasonable care in the design
and construction of the tank, in the selection of the
materials used in its manufacture and in the test to
determine the safety thereof.
As Judge Cardozo held in

B1tick~

supra:

"If the nature of the thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of
danger there is added knowledge that the thing
will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. ***
If danger was to be expected ~s. reasonably ce~
tain, there was a duty of vigilance, and this
whether you call the danger inherent or imminent."
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Thus, contractor Stearns' liability is based on its
creation of an unreasonable risk of harm and not upon
the kind of commodity which it installed.
The Buick rule has been extended to building contractors and repairmen. See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moin~s Steel Co._, 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir. 1948);
Thompson v. Bttrke Engineering Sales_, 252 Iowa 146,
106 N.W.2d 351 (1960); Inman v. Binghampton_, 3
N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957); Boutell v. Scott-'s
Royal Tire Co._, 365 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1963);
Spencer v. Madson_, 142 F.2d 820 {lOth Cir. 1944).
In the field of products liability law, the trend has
been from negligence to strict warranty liability. See
the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors_,
Inc._, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 {1960), and the cases
which dispense with the privity rule in express warranty
cases starting with Randy Knitwear_, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co._, 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 {1962).
In accord: Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co._,
290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 {1939); Arfons v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours ~ Co._, 261 F .2d 434 ( 2d Cir.
1958); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co._, 167 O~hio
St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Hamen v. Firestone
Tire ~ Rubber Co._, 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co._, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d
409 (1932).
See also Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
Yale L.J. 1099, 1114-24 (1960).
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The modern rule of strict privity free warranty
liability developed since DiVello v. Gardner Machine
Co._, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951), now finds
expression in Restatement (Second) Torts, Section
402a, approved May 1, 1961, doing away with the
privity requirement at all levels of manufacturing and
distribution and imposing on sellers coming within its
terms the full responsibility of strict liability.
While Section 402a refers to products for intimate
bodily use, the decisions now go beyond such limitations
and hold the manufacturer of any product which is
likely to be dangerous if defective to strict privity free
liability. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders ~ Masonry Supply_, Inc._, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(!1958); Conti.nental Copper ~ Steel Industries v.
E. C. "'"Red"'"' Cornelius_, Inc._, 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App.
1958); McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp.,
137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962); B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
Hammond_, 269 F.2d 501 (lOth Cir. 1959); Peterson
v. Lamb Rubber Co._, 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co._, 156 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super.
1959); Henningsen v. Bloo~field Motors_, Inc._, 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 ( 1960) ; General Motors Corp. v.
Dodson_, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655; Pabon
v. Hackensack Auto Sales_, Inc._, 63 N.J. Super. 476,
164 A.2d 773 (1960); Connolly v. Hagi_, 24 Conn. Sup.
198, 188 A.2d 884 ( 1963).
A case which carries the manufacturer's strict
liability even further is Greenman v. Yuba Power
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Products~ Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), where Jus-

tice Traynor states, "A manufacturer of any product who sells it in a condition dangerous for use is
strictly liable to its ultimate use for injuries resulting
from such use, despite absence of privity of contract
and exercise of all possible care."
See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. and
Lockheed A.ircraft Corp.~ 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (Court of Appeals, New York,
May 9, 1963).
The Goldberg decision is followed by a recent California landmark case, Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Compa·ny~ 391 P.2d 168 (1964}:
"Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in
the business of distributing goods to the p_ublic.
They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear
the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases the retailer may be the only
member of that en~rprise reasonably available
to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer
himself may play a substantial part in insuring
that the product is safe or may be in a position to
exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end;
the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added
incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the
·costs of such protection between them in the
course of their continuing business relationship."
These rules

focus

responsibility

for

defects,
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whether negligently or non-negligently caused, on the
manufacturer of the completed product, and they apply
regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the
manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties.
Logically, therefore, if defendant Stearns, as the
building contractor, is chargeable with the same liability
of one who as a manufacturer makes a chattel for the
use of others, then the inherent defect in this fan is
chargeable to Stearns, the building contractor, designer
and industrial architect of this plant.
Indeed, defendant Stearns by its contract with
T-Z (Plf. Ex. 1, Art. 16, p. 19) placed itself in the
position of the manufacturer, Duriron Company:
"Guaranties:
The Contractor guarantees the work, material,
equipment and supplies against defective workmanship and material until the expiration of one
(I). year from the date of final acceptance of
the work by the Company. With respect to the
Contractor's guaranty as to material, equipment
and supplies, it is agreed that the Contractor will
be saved and held harmless by the Company from
damage claims of any nature beyond the replacement or repair of the defective material, equipment and supplies, f.o.b. factory, it being understood that the Con.tractor~s guaranty as to material~ equipment and supplies does not go beyon~
and back of the dealers~ and manufacturers
guaranties where such material~ equipment and
snpp.Zies were selected by the Company and purchased by the Contractor.n (Emphasis supplied)
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Thus, defendant Stearns makes the identical warranty
set forth in plaintiff's Exhibit 6,
"No surface coating, paint or lining to deteriorate and fail."
The rule seems now clear that a building contrac;..
tor can no longer hide behind the out-moded "work
accepted and completed doctrine'' and even the demand
requiring a showing of negligence and privity of contract is no longer required. Building contractors, including manufacturers, must stand behind their work
and products with the risk to users from defective products cast upon industry as an enterprise risk.
The lower Court could have more logically granted
a plaintiff's motion for liability, than dismissing the
case, on any of plaintiff's five theories. Plaintiff submits that Otis Elevator~ if it is still Utah law, should be
soundly overturned.

LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
THE

POINT II. BY HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT STEARNS WAS NOT LIABLE
BECAUSE THE FAN WAS SELECTED BY
AND FURNISHED AT REQUEST OF T-Z,
PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER.
Defendant seeks to escape liability by urging that
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T-Z selected and requested the specific fan, and Stearns
simply carried out its directions.

The evidence is overwhelming and the expert
testimony of chief chemist Maurice, Mr. Bush, Mr.
George and the affidavit of plaintiff's expert Ursenbach, demonstrate uncontrovertibly that no reasonable
contractor would install a fan containing an organic
material to be used in connection with exhausting perchloric fumes. But this defense raises a jury question
and does not entitle Stearns to judg1nent as a matter
of law._
True, defendant Stearns is not a simple supplier
of chattels, like a retailer, who is excused from exercising unusual care in searching out hidden defects in
articles made by responsible manufacturers; but where,
as here, defendant Stearns with its special skill and
competence in the chemical industry knew, should have
known, or had reason to know the concealed danger,
whether patent or latent, its liability is clear. The
danger of an explosion during normal maintenance
of this fan was obvious and foreseeable and where
through the exercise of its own skill and experience
Stearns could or should or had reason to realize that
harm was foreseeable, if the equipment requested by
T-Z was installed, the defense that T-Z selected such
equipment should not bar this action as a matter of law.
Stearns may have relied upon Duriron Company's
express warranty that this fan contained, "no coating,
lining or paint that would deteriorate or fail," but it had
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an overriding duty to this plaintiff to test and check
the sealing compound upon installation and determine
whether or not it was organic in nature, well knowing
that perchloric acid condensates create a time bomb.
As Judge Medina states in Fredericks v. American
Export Line (2d Cir. 1955), 227 F.2d 450:

" *** A

bomb is nonetheless deadly if it contains a time mechanism. On the other hand, evidence of the passage of time, together with that
of other attendant circumstances, is admissible,
in order that a jury may not be led astray. The
mere passage of time confers no immunity upon
a :qegligent wrongdoer; but it has relevance to
_the likelihood, depending upon the circumstances
of a particular case, that deterioration due to use,
perhaps accelerated my misuse, will be mistaken
by a jury for a defect due to negligent manufacture or fabrication. On the evidence before us
in this case, we cannot say the jury went beyond
permissible and rational inference in attributing
the accident to Farrington's negligent fabricatio~
of the skid iron, which cracked and came a part,
despite at least two and one-half years of apparently safe use and normally rough handling."
Stearns was the industrial architect and designer
of this plant; it fashioned the plans and specifications
(Plf. Ex. 2, 3, 4). The fact that it incorporated Duriron fans, requested by 'f-Z, does not insulate Stearns
from liability since a reasonable person would have
determined first whether or not the fan contained a
dangerous organic material, and Stearns should not
escape liability because it followed out T-Z's recommendations. The contractor should not be able to hide
25
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behind the skirts of T-Z when Stearns was the designer,
architect and engineer and where through the exercise
of its own skill and experience, contractor could realize
that harm was foreseeable if a defective fan was
installed.
The warranty of Duriron was the warranty of
defendant Stearns. (R. 196, 197)
The A.E.C. knew the inherent danger early in
1956 when it required a vVinchester, Massachusetts, lab
to be rebuilt and replaced all hoods and ducts made out
of plastic and ceramic and stone. (George Depo., p. 48,
49) These procedures were well known to chemists
since 1952 (see Ursenbach Affidavit, R. 169, 170, 171)
and should have been equally within the knowledge of
Stearns. The fact that the defect was latent does not
excuse Stearns.
The grouting was open and obvious (see Ex. A
and B, attached to Bush deposition, closeup of similar
fan). The "X" marked on Exhibit A indicates the
deteriorated area of the grouting, it would have been
obvious to any one who looked or tested. Mr. ~ush
received his injury on June 29, 1959, when he simply
prodded the stuff with a screwdriver (see Bush Depo.,
p. 7, 8, 9).
Rather than being uninforn1ed of the hazards of
perchloric acid, industry has been extremely cautious
in accepting these chemicals because of their well known
haza~dous nature. Recommended procedures have been
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given by perchloric acid manufacturers, users and national organizations charged with the responsibility for
safety in all phases of industry. It is no defense that
Stearns utilized this fan in the design and construction
of the chem lab here upon the specific request and selection of T -Z. Organic material in this fan does not meet
industry standards and safe practice standards and- is
inherently dangerous. (R. 171)
A contractor may not heedlessly install obviously
defective equipment. Belk v. J. A.. Jones Constructio1~
Company~ 272 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Harley v.
Blodgett Engineering and Tool Company~ 230 Mich.
510, 202 N.\V. 953 (1925). See Bell, Professional
Negligence of Architects and Engineers~ 1212 Vand.
L. Rev. 711 and Annotations, 59 A.L.R.2d at 1072.
Restatement of Torts, Section 353.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
POINT III. BY HOLDING THAT EVEN
IF DEFENDANT S'l"'EARNS WAS NEGLIGENT, THE KNOWLEDGE OF T-Z OF
PRIOR EXPLOSIONS AND THE HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE FAN IS AN
INTERVENING
CAUSE
WHICI-I
RELIEVES DEFENDANT S'l"'EARNS FROM
LIABILI'fY.
27
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This proposition, of course, assumes that T -Z was
thoroughly aware of the hazard. The truth is, this
danger was unknown to T-Z. (See Maurice Depo., p.
14, line 27, and p. 37, line 7) Maurice admits that he
was not aware of the problem and at p. 31, line 29,
where Mr. Maurice admits it was four to five months
after the explosion that he learned the cause. If this was
the case, how could plaintiff Leininger be charged with
such knowledge. Stearns itself urges that it had no
knowledge of the Leininger problem until after the
commencement of the lawsuit. Notwithstanding, the
court erred as a matter of law.
The failure of T-Z, plaintiff's employer ,to perform a duty owing plaintiff to protect plaintiff from
harm threatened by defendant Stearns' negligent conduct is not a superseding or intervening cause of plaintiff herein. Restatement of Torts, Section 452.
This rule applies not only where a third person
employer makes no effort to perform his duties but also
where through his negligence, his attempt to do so is
unsuccessful.
Since Stearns the builder-manufacturer cannot
relieve itself from liability by informing the person who
is to use the product, it follows that the users knowledge
of its dangerous character acquired from other sources
can have 110 greater effect. See Section 389, Comment b,
Restatement of Torts.
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T-Z's failure to perform its duty in this respect
may make it concurrently liable but is not a superseding
or intervening cause. See Northwestern Nat. Insurance

Company v. Rogers~ ·Pattern & A.luminum Foundry) 166 P.2d 401, and Peterson v. Rand Construction) 246 N.Y.S.2d 69, holding the intervening negligence of lessee not knowingly using defective product
does not insulate lessor from liability; and see Fredericks v. American Export Line~ supra~ holding:
"It is elementary that the concurrent negligence of some third person will not absolve a
defendant upon whom liability is sought to be
imposed for the consequences of his own delict.
Could the jury here, on the evidence before it,
have properly found that the flow of causation,
arising from the negligent fabrication of the skid
iron by Farrington, was broken by McGrath's
failure to discover the defect?
That the intervening purchaser will remain
passive or otherwise fail to do what he ought to
do to prevent the course of events, is a reasonably
··foreseeable consequence of the original wrongdoing. Moreover, this is not a distinction based
upon mere passivity but rather upon whether
or not the ultimate fact or occurrence is reasonably foreseeable. This is a far cry from the doing
of something or the refraining from doing some. thing constituting an improbable, independent,
intervening cause, which is a superseding cause
and breaks the sequence. Perry v. Rochester Lime
Co., 219 N.Y. 60, 113 N.E. 529, L.R.A. 1917B,
1058; Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 1946, 183
'fenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 852, 164 A.L.R. 364;
Prosser, Torts, Sec. 49 ( 1941) ."
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
POINT IV. BY ITS REFUSAL TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO A JURY FOR TRIAL
ON TORT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT
(WARRANTY) THEORIES.
Two leading cases, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products Cornpany_, supra_, and Strandholm v. General Construction Company_, 382 P.2d 843 (Ore.
1963), sustain this proposition. In Palmer v. W a8atch
Chemical Company (1960) 10 Utah 2d 383, 353 P.2d
985, this court adopts Section 402, Restatement of
Torts, and holds that case was properly submitted to
the jury both on theories of negligence and on grounds
of breach of contract. See Hewitt v. General Tire and
Rubber Company_, 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471.
The product in this case was not put to any unusual use. It exploded in the course of normal maintenance and upkeep and was warranted expressly and
by implication to be fit for such purposes.
The lower court entirely ignored plaintiff's third,
fourth and fifth causes of action which alleged breach
of express warranty, and breach of implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability, in addition to the first two
causes setting forth the general negligence.

THE

LOWER

COURT

ERRED

IN
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GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO'fiON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
POINT V. BY REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBITS NUMBERS 8, 9, IO, II AND I2 IN
EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff produced the affidavit of Wayne 0. Ursenbach, an expert witness (R. I69, I70, I7I), the depositions of chief chemist Maurice, A.E.C. employees
Bush and George, who freely conceded that the use of
perchloric acid was standard in the uranium industry
and that its use in connection with an exhaust fan containing organic material was inherently and imminently
dangerous. Reputation of these experts has not been
challenged. 1,heir expert opinion, which also has been
expressed in A.E.C. reports and articles given nationwide dissemination, must be determined to have been
inferably within the knowledge of Stearns as it was
within the knowledge of the manufacturer, Duriron
Company, as well as others in the uranium industry.
These facts are set forth in plaintiff's proffered Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, all of which were erroneously
rejected by the pretrial judge. The Court's attention is
called to the language of plaintiff's Exhibit II:
"March 19, 1962
SUBJECT:
EXHAUST OF PERCHLORIC ACID
FUMES
To Users of Durco Fans:
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. We are advised that standard fans manufactured by our Company are being employed under
varying conditions to exhaust the fumes from
perchloric acid (particularly in wet chemical
processes for analysis of ores of the rare earth
variety) and that a recent explosion, in which
one of our fans was involved, resulted in a fatality
in the plant of such a user.
It is well known that perchloric acid is inherently explosive. If condensates of perchloric
acid are allowed to gather in the crevices between
the assembled parts of a fan or, for that matter,
on any parf of the fan, such condensates may
explode, spontaneously, by friction or in the
presence of moderate heat or if the fan is subject
to any impact or probing .for the purpose, for
example, of inspection, maintenance or disassembling.
The metals and all other materials employed
in our fans are nonexplosive, alone, or in the
combination with each other. Perchloric residue,
however, is explosive whether in a fan, hood, duct
or elsewhere.
In view of the hazards inherent in perchloric
acid we have decided that hereafter we will not
sell any fans for use to exhaust perchloric acid
fumes.
If you continue to use or recommend to others
the use of any of our fans in the presence of perchloric acid fumes, you must do so at your own
risk and with full knowledge that if the fan accumulates perchloric acid condensates there will
exist an inherent possibility of explosion.
Very truly yours,
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THE DURIRON COMPANY, INC.
Is/ W. D. Staley
W. D. Staley,
Executive Vice President."
These documents were offered for the purpose of
showing, notwithstanding the date each _document
bears, that the hazard and danger must be determined
to have been inferably within the knowledge of Stearns,
and the jury could have found that Stearns had, should
have had, or had reason to have such knowledge, at the
time it installed the fans. The exhibits were not offered
to show other and similar fan explosions, but for the
purpose of notice of the inherent danger.

THE LOWER COUR'l., ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE:
POINT VI. IN THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR JURY
TRIAL.
As this Court has so often reasoned, it is only
where it is perfectly clear that there are no issues in the
case that summary judgment is proper. Here the evidence, admissions, and inferences, when viewed in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, show the existence of
genuine issues as to material facts and that the defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
See Green v. Garn~ II Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d I050;
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.~ II Utah
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2d 1, 354 P.2d 559. Even in cases where the judge is
of the opinion that he may direct a verdict for one party
or the other on the issues that have been raised, he
should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather than attempt to try the case in advance on a
motion for summary judgment, which was never intended to enable parties to avert jury trials or have
the judge weigh evidence in advance of its being presented. "It is the general proposition that issues of
negligence, including such related issues as contributory
negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary
adjudication either for or against the claimant, but
should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner."
See 6 Moore~ s Federal Practice~ 2232 Section 56.17
( 42).

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lower court,
committed gross error in dismissing his case and prays
this court reverse the lower court's judgment remanding the matter for jury trial.
Respectfully submitted,
A. WALLY SANDACK
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Dated: October 1, 1964.
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